27 January 2016

Notes - mid-morning / thank you / soul and philosophy background /



       Mid-morning. Jill is coming to clean later this morning so you and Carol will be off and away from the house for a few hours. Basically, the everyday events including lunch out are the norm – moving among the familiar haunts such as Kroger’s, Target/Walmart and Graeter’s every couple of days or so. You have the coupon for Smashburgers for today if Carol so chooses. Also, you have continued with your forty-minute plus exercises five days a week and plan on continuing. You and Carol really use you Xmased Fitbits in your daily routines. – Amorella

       0848 minutes. I am thankful you gave me a direction on Dead 11 last night even though at present I cannot imagine how I’ll pull it off.

       Delicious humor, huh? The kind you loved to pull on your students several times a year. – Amorella

       0850 hours. Put in this light, I should say so myself. By the by, this morning while picking up the newspapers from the driveways I kept saying a catchy phrase (a little ditty) that came out of nowhere. Now I can’t remember what it was other that a reference to ‘light’ and ‘dark’ was a part.

       Post. - Amorella

       You are waiting for Carol who is walking laps at the community center. You found an article that appears to be apropos to the definition of soul in your usage. – Amorella

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Supplement to Aristotle's Psychology

A Question about the Metaphysics of Souls

In Section 10 of his exceptionally clear entry on Aristotle’s Metaphysics in this encyclopedia, S. Marc Cohen briefly recapitulates the lively debate among Aristotelian commentators regarding the status of particular forms in Aristotle.

As Cohen notes, some things Aristotle says in his Metaphysics suggest that forms, as substances, must be particulars; other things he says suggest that forms, as objects of knowledge, must be universals.

If nothing can be both a universal and a particular, then something must give: if Aristotle is to avoid contradicting himself on a topic of such central importance to his entire metaphysical system, then one set of textual data will need to be subordinated to the other.

Cohen argues with considerable force that it is particularity, which must give way: forms are universals and, though they are substances, nothing said by Aristotle entails that they are therefore particulars.

As Cohen rightly reports, most of the data for this debate is drawn from Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Consequently, any fully defensible argument on behalf of particular forms will need to engage that data. Moreover, any such argument will also now need to address Cohen’s lucid deployment of that data. Naturally, a discussion of Aristotle’s psychology is not the place to conduct such a discussion.

Still, a discussion of Aristotle’s psychology is just the place to reflect briefly on the metaphysics of souls, because hylomorphism [the theory derived from Aristotle that every physical object is composed of two principles, an unchanging prime matter and a form deprived of actuality with every substantial change of the object] finds its most nuanced and engaging expression in the metaphysics of living beings.

To the extent that this sort of discussion also has repercussions regarding the problem of particular forms, it is also worth conducting any such inquiry with an eye to the metaphysics of forms as such. This is especially so since some things Aristotle says in the Metaphysics suggest that he restricts substantiality to living beings, or, more weakly, that he regards living beings as paradigmatic substances (Metaphysics viii 2, 1043a4–5; vii 17, 1041b21–3).

More to the point, there is a simple argument drawn from the hylomorphic account of souls and bodies in De Anima, which tells in favor of particular forms. Although this argument does nothing to refute the arguments and interpretations provided by Cohen and other detractors of particular forms, it does provide some reason to wonder whether their arguments should be revisited. The argument is this: (i) the soul is a form; (ii) the soul is something particular; therefore, (iii) there are particular forms, namely souls.

As an interpretation of Aristotle, the first premise of this argument cannot be in doubt. Here is what he says: ‘It is necessary, then, that the soul must be a substance as the form of a natural body having life in potentiality’ (De Anima ii 1, 412a19–21). So Aristotle regards the soul as a substance and as a form. It therefore follows that he endorses the first premise (i) of our simple argument.

That leaves only the second premise (ii), that souls are particulars, which detractors of particular forms are consequently constrained to reject. There seem to be but two ways of doing so: by treating souls as universals or by denying that a distinction between universals and particulars is mutually exclusive and exhaustive.

Neither alternative looks especially attractive either in fact or as an interpretation of Aristotle. (It should be said, however, that the second alternative has found some surprisingly capable defenders among Aristotle’s exegetes, at least as applied to forms generally, if not to souls more narrowly.)

Of course, some of the direct linguistic evidence regarding the soul’s particularity is subject to the same limitations as those appropriately noted by Cohen. If, for example, it is implied that the soul is a tode ti (De Anima ii 1, 412a7–8), then this may require its being some this, i.e. some particular thing, or perhaps merely this something or other, i.e. something falling under a sortal [*1. (Logic) – a concept, grasp of which includes knowledge of criteria of individuation and reidentification; 2. (Logic) - a count noun representing such a concept]

Since universals too fall under sortals, perhaps as far as this linguistic data is concerned, souls are conceivably universals. Parallel cases may be made about other comparable locutions.

It seems somehow unlikely, however, that when Aristotle claims that Socrates can be identified with either a compound or a soul that he means to imply that ‘Socrates’ can be used to name a universal (Metaphysics vii 11, 1037a7; cf. Generation of Animals iv 2–3, 767a20–768b1).

Moreover, given the roles ascribed to it by Aristotle, there is some additional philosophical reason for supposing that the soul is particular. If the soul is, for instance, the efficient cause of motion (De Anima i 1, 403a24–b9; ii 4, 415b8, Partibus Animalium i 1, 641a17–b10), then it seems responsible for the motion of an individual body in a specific place and time.

Much the same can be said for perception and thinking, where the perceptual and intellectual activities of Socrates seem to be the activities of an individual, situated in a peculiar place and time, and explained not by the presence of a uniform universal, but by dint of there being individual psychological faculties deployed on particular occasions.

In these ways, it seems natural to understand Socrates’ soul to be numerically and qualitatively distinct from Callias’ soul.

So it also seems natural to think of their souls as particulars, rather than as a single universal twice betokened.

These brief considerations are, of course, in no way intended to prove that Aristotle commits himself to the existence of particular forms.

They are, however, intended to provide some prima facie evidence for that claim by showing what must be denied if we are to understand him as resisting such a conclusion.
In short, those who find no commitment to particular forms in Aristotle must also find in him no commitment to particular souls.

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Selected and edited from --http://plato.stanfordDOTedu/entries/aristotle-psychology/suppl2.html

*[Dictionary used] – The Free Dictionary by Farlex

I separated (edited) the paragraphs so that I may more easily follow the thought. I also placed the 'bold' as a reminder.  - rho

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       You spent much of the afternoon reading over another piece on ‘souls’ plus with this longer article:

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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Metaphysics

First published Mon Sep 10, 2007; substantive revision Fri Oct 31, 2014
It is not easy to say what metaphysics is. Ancient and Medieval philosophers might have said that metaphysics was, like chemistry or astrology, to be defined by its subject matter: metaphysics was the “science” that studied “being as such” or “the first causes of things” or “things that do not change”. It is no longer possible to define metaphysics that way, for two reasons. First, a philosopher who denied the existence of those things that had once been seen as constituting the subject-matter of metaphysics—first causes or unchanging things—would now be considered to be making thereby a metaphysical assertion. Second, there are many philosophical problems that are now considered to be metaphysical problems (or at least partly metaphysical problems) that are in no way related to first causes or unchanging things—the problem of free will, for example, or the problem of the mental and the physical.

The first three sections of this entry examine a broad selection of problems considered to be metaphysical and discuss ways in which the purview of metaphysics has expanded over time. We shall see that the central problems of metaphysics were significantly more unified in the Ancient and Medieval eras. Which raises a question—is there any common feature that unites the problems of contemporary metaphysics? The final two sections discuss some recent theories of the nature and methodology of metaphysics. We will also consider arguments that metaphysics, however defined, is an impossible enterprise.

Entry Contents
                1. The Word ‘Metaphysics’ and the Concept of Metaphysics
                2. The Problems of Metaphysics: the “Old” Metaphysics
2.1 Being As Such, First Causes, Unchanging Things
2.2 Categories of Being and Universals
2.3 Substance
                3. The Problems of Metaphysics: the “New” Metaphysics
3.1 Modality
3.2 Space and Time
3.3 Persistence and Constitution
3.4 Causation, Freedom and Determinism
3.5 The Mental and Physical
                4. The Methodology of Metaphysics
                5. Is Metaphysics Possible?
                Bibliography
                Academic Tools
                Other Internet Resources
                Related Entries


1. The Word ‘Metaphysics’ and the Concept of Metaphysics

The word ‘metaphysics’ is notoriously hard to define. Twentieth-century coinages like ‘meta-language’ and ‘metaphilosophy’ encourage the impression that metaphysics is a study that somehow “goes beyond” physics, a study devoted to matters that transcend the mundane concerns of Newton and Einstein and Heisenberg. This impression is mistaken. The word ‘metaphysics’ is derived from a collective title of the fourteen books by Aristotle that we currently think of as making up Aristotle's Metaphysics. Aristotle himself did not know the word. (He had four names for the branch of philosophy that is the subject-matter of Metaphysics: ‘first philosophy’, ‘first science’, ‘wisdom’, and ‘theology’.
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Author and Citation Information for "Metaphysics"

The latest version of the entry "Metaphysics" may be cited via the earliest archive in which this version appears:

van Inwagen, Peter and Sullivan, Meghan, "Metaphysics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .

The citation above refers to the version in the following archive edition:
                Spring 2015 (minor correction)
                 
Please note that you are being asked to cite a URL that is in a fixed, archived edition of the encyclopedia. The reason for this is that the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy recommends that readers cite a stable document for scholarly purposes.

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       2038 hours. I worked on the above 14,129 word article but it is copyrighted so I have about 450 words above. The article can easily be found online. Also, below is the introduction of the article “Metaphysics” in Wikipedia. I find it too general to pick and choose from.

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Metaphysics

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Metaphysics is a traditional branch of philosophy concerned with explaining the fundamental nature of being and the world that encompasses it, although the term is not easily defined. Traditionally, metaphysics attempts to answer two basic questions in the broadest possible terms:

1               Ultimately, what is there?
2               What is it like?
              
A person who studies metaphysics is called a metaphysician. The metaphysician attempts to clarify the fundamental notions by which people understand the world, e.g., existence, objects and their properties, space and time, cause and effect, and possibility. A central branch of metaphysics is ontology, the investigation into the basic categories of being and how they relate to each other. Another central branch of metaphysics is cosmology, the study of the origin, fundamental structure, nature, and dynamics of the universe. Some include epistemology as another central focus of metaphysics, but others question this.

Prior to the modern history of science, scientific questions were addressed as a part of metaphysics known as natural philosophy. Originally, the term "science" (Latin scientia) simply meant "knowledge". The scientific method, however, transformed natural philosophy into an empirical activity deriving from experiment unlike the rest of philosophy. By the end of the 18th century, it had begun to be called "science" to distinguish it from philosophy. Thereafter, metaphysics denoted philosophical enquiry of a non-empirical character into the nature of existence. Some philosophers of science, such as the neo-positivists, say that natural science rejects the study of metaphysics, while other philosophers of science strongly disagree.

Etymology

The word "metaphysics" derives from the Greek words μετά (meta, "beyond", "upon" or "after") and φυσικά (physiká, "physics"). It was first used as the title for several of Aristotle's works, because they were usually anthologized after the works on physics in complete editions. The prefix meta- ("after") indicates that these works come "after" the chapters on physics. However, Aristotle himself did not call the subject of these books "Metaphysics": he referred to it as "first philosophy." The editor of Aristotle's works, Andronicus of Rhodes, is thought to have placed the books on first philosophy right after another work, Physics, and called them τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ βιβλία (ta meta ta physika biblia) or "the books that come after the [books on] physics". This was misread by Latin scholiasts, who thought it meant "the science of what is beyond the physical".

However, once the name was given, the commentators sought to find intrinsic reasons for its appropriateness. For instance, it was understood to mean "the science of the world beyond nature" (physis in Greek), that is, the science of the immaterial. Again, it was understood to refer to the chronological or pedagogical order among our philosophical studies, so that the "metaphysical sciences" would mean "those that we study after having mastered the sciences that deal with the physical world" (St. Thomas Aquinas, Expositio in librum Boethii De hebdomadibus, V, 1).

There is a widespread use of the term in current popular literature which replicates this understanding, i.e. that the metaphysical equates to the non-physical: thus, "metaphysical healing" means healing by means of remedies that are not physical.

Selected and edited from Wikipedia

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       Below are further general notes on the ‘soul’ from Wikipedia. I am troubled that I cannot document more of notes in the posting but I have backup information over the years – the point is that I want to create a segment that follows through with what many believe the soul to be but also I want it open enough for my own interpretation within the Merlyn fiction. Plausibility is the key. I want the work to be realistic and open to discussion. I want the reader to think and consider as well as to energize her or his imagination.

       Orndorff, you are only writing between seven hundred and eight hundred words in the segment. – Amorella

       2115 hours. I will have thought this out first. I’m not looking for perfection but I want to make this work for solid thinking for student thinkers of all mature ages, ages 16/18 on.

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Soul

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The soul in many religions, philosophical and mythological traditions, is the incorporeal and immortal essence of a living being. According to Abrahamic religions, only human beings have immortal souls. For example, the Catholic theologian Thomas Aquinas attributed "soul" (anima) to all organisms but argued that only human souls are immortal. Other religions (most notably Jainism and Hinduism) teach that all biological organisms have souls, while some teach that even non-biological entities (such as rivers and mountains) possess souls. This latter belief is called animism.

Greek philosophers such as Socrates, Plato and Aristotle understood that the psyche (ψυχή) must have a logical faculty, the exercise of which was the most divine of human actions. At his defense trial, Socrates even summarized his teaching as nothing other than an exhortation for his fellow Athenians to excel in matters of the psyche since all bodily goods are dependent on such excellence (The Apology 30a–b).

Anima mundi is the concept of a "world soul" connecting all living organisms on the planet.

Etymology

The Modern English word “soul”, derived from Old English sáwol, sáwel, was first attested in the 8th-century poem Beowulf v. 2820 and in the Vespasian Psalter 77.50. It is cognate with other German and Baltic terms for the same idea, including Gothic saiwala, Old High German sêula, sêla, Old Saxon sêola, Old Low Franconian sêla, sîla, Old Norse sála and Lithuanian siela. Further etymology of the Germanic word is uncertain. The original concept is meant to be 'coming from or belonging to the sea/lake', because of the German belief in souls being born out of and returning to sacred lakes, Old Saxon sêola (soul) compared to Old Saxon sêo (sea).

The Koine Greek word ψυχή psyche, "life, spirit, consciousness", is derived from a verb meaning "to cool, to blow", and hence refers to the breath, as opposed to σῶμα ("soma"), meaning "body". Psychē occurs juxtaposed to σῶμα, as seen in Matthew 10:28 . . .

Vulgate: et nolite timere eos qui occidunt corpus animam autem non possunt occidere sed potius eum timete qui potest et animam et corpus perdere in gehennam.

Authorized King James Version (KJV) "And fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell."

In the Septuagint (LXX), ψυχή translates Hebrew נפש nephesh, meaning "life, vital breath", and specifically refers to a mortal, physical life, but is in English variously translated as "soul, self, life, creature, person, appetite, mind, living being, desire, emotion, passion"; an example can be found in Genesis 1:20: . . .

Vulgate Creavitque Deus cete grandia, et omnem animam viventem atque motabilem.

KJV "And God created great whales, and every living creature that moveth."

. . .

Philosophical views

The Ancient Greeks used the word "alive" for the concept of being “ensouled”, indicating that the earliest surviving western philosophical view believed that the soul was that which gave the body life. The soul was considered the incorporeal or spiritual "breath" that animates (from the Latin, anima, cf. "animal") the living organism. Francis M. Cornford quotes Pindar by saying that the soul sleeps while the limbs are active, but when one is sleeping, the soul is active and reveals "an award of joy or sorrow drawing near" in dreams. Erwin Rohde writes that an early pre-Pythagorean belief presented the soul as lifeless when it departed the body, and that it retired into Hades with no hope of returning to a body.

Socrates and Plato

Drawing on the words of his teacher Socrates, Plato considered the psyche to be the essence of a person, being that which decides how we behave. He considered this essence to be an incorporeal, eternal occupant of our being. Socrates says that even after death, the soul exists and is able to think. He believed that as bodies die, the soul is continually reborn in subsequent bodies and Plato believed this as well, however, he thought that only one part of the soul was immortal (logos).

The Platonic soul consists of three parts:
                the logos, or logistikon (mind, nous, or reason)
                the thymos, or thumetikon (emotion, spiritedness, or masculine)
                the eros, or epithumetikon (appetitive, desire, or feminine)
                 
The parts are located in different regions of the body:
                logos is located in the head, is related to reason and regulates the other part.
                thymos is located near the chest region and is related to anger.
                eros is located in the stomach and is related to one's desires.
                 
Plato also compares the three parts of the soul or psyche to a societal caste system. According to Plato's theory, the three-part soul is essentially the same thing as a state's class system because, to function well, each part must contribute so that the whole functions well. Logos keeps the other functions of the soul regulated.

Aristotle

Aristotle (384 BC – 322 BC) defined the soul, or Psūchê (ψυχή), as the “first actuality” of a naturally organized body, and argued against its separate existence from the physical body. In Aristotle's view, the primary activity, or full actualization, of a living thing constitutes its soul. For example, the full actualization of an eye, as an independent organism, is to see (its purpose or final cause). Another example is that the full actualization of a human being would be living a fully functional human life in accordance with reason (which he considered to be a faculty unique to humanity). For Aristotle, the soul is the organization of the form and matter of a natural being which allows it to strive for its full actualization. This organization between form and matter is necessary for any activity, or functionality, to be possible in a natural being. Using an artifact (non-natural being) as an example, a house is a building for human habituation, but for a house to be actualized requires the material (wood, nails, bricks, etc.) necessary for its actuality (i.e. being a fully functional house). However, this does not imply that a house has a soul. In regards to artifacts, the source of motion that is required for their full actualization is outside of themselves (for example, a builder builds a house). In natural beings, this source of motion is contained within the being itself. Aristotle elaborates on this point when he addresses the faculties of the soul.

The various faculties of the soul, such as nutrition, movement (peculiar to animals), reason (peculiar to humans), sensation (special, common, and incidental) and so forth, when exercised, constitute the "second" actuality, or fulfillment, of the capacity to be alive. For example, someone who falls asleep, as opposed to someone who falls dead, can wake up and live [her/his] life, while the latter can no longer do so.

Aristotle identified three hierarchical levels of natural beings: plants, animals, and people. For these groups, he identified three corresponding levels of soul, or biological activity: the nutritive activity of growth, sustenance and reproduction which all life shares; the self-willed motive activity and sensory faculties, which only animals and people have in common; and finally "reason", of which people alone are capable.

Aristotle's discussion of the soul is in his work, De Anima (On the Soul). Although mostly seen as opposing Plato in regard to the immortality of the soul, a controversy can be found in relation to the fifth chapter of the third book. In this text both interpretations can be argued for, soul as a whole can be deemed mortal and a part called "active intellect" or "active mind" is immortal and eternal. Advocates exist for both sides of the controversy, but it has been understood that there will be permanent disagreement about its final conclusions, as no other Aristotelian text contains this specific point, and this part of De Anima is obscure.

Avicenna and Ibn al-Nafis

Following Aristotle, Avicena (Ibn Sina) and Ibn al-Nafis, a Persian philosopher, further elaborated upon the Aristotelian understanding of the soul and developed their own theories on the soul. They both made a distinction between the soul and the spirit, and the Avicennian doctrine on the nature of the soul was influential among the Scholastics. Some of Avicenna's views on the soul include the idea that the immortality of the soul is a consequence of its nature, and not a purpose for it to fulfill. In his theory of "The Ten Intellects", he viewed the human soul as the tenth and final intellect.

While he was imprisoned, Avicenna wrote his famous "Floating Man" thought experiment to demonstrate human self-awareness and the substantial nature of the soul. He told his readers to imagine themselves suspended in the air, isolated from all sensations, which includes no sensory contact with even their own bodies. He argues that in this scenario one would still have self-consciousness. He thus concludes that the idea of the self is not logically dependent on any physical thing, and that the soul should not be seen in relative terms, but as a primary given, a substance. This argument was later refined and simplified by Rene Descartes in epistemic terms, when he stated: "I can abstract from the supposition of all external things, but not from the supposition of my own consciousness.”

Avicenna generally supported Aristotle's idea of the soul originating from the heart, whereas Ibn al-Nafis rejected this idea and instead argued that the soul "is related to the entirety and not to one or a few organs”. He further criticized Aristotle's idea whereby every unique soul requires the existence of a unique source, in this case the heart. al-Nafis concluded that "the soul is related primarily neither to the spirit nor to any organ, but rather to the entire matter whose temperament is prepared to receive that soul," and he defined the soul as nothing other than "what a human indicates by saying “I”.

Thomas Aquinas

Following Aristotle and Avicenna, Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) understood the soul to be the first actuality of the living body. Consequent to this, he distinguished three orders of life: plants, which feed and grow; animals, which add sensation to the operations of plants; and humans, which add intellect to the operations of animals.

Concerning the human soul, his epistemological theory required that, since the knower becomes what he knows, the soul is definitely not corporeal—if it is corporeal when it knows what some corporeal thing is, that thing would come to be within it.  Therefore, the soul has an operation, which does not rely on a body organ, and therefore the soul could can exist without a body. Furthermore, since the rational soul of human beings is a subsistent form and not something made of matter and form, it cannot be destroyed in any natural process. The full argument for the immortality of the soul and Aquinas' elaboration of Aristotelian theory is found in Question 75 of the Summa Theologica.

Immanuel Kant

In his discussions of rational psychology, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) identified the soul as the "I" in the strictest sense, and that the existence of inner experience can neither be proved nor disproved. "We cannot prove a priori the immateriality of the soul, but rather only so much: that all properties and actions of the soul cannot be recognized from materiality". It is from the "I", or soul, that Kant proposes transcendental rationalization, but cautions that such rationalization can only determine the limits of knowledge if it is to remain practical.

Philosophy of mind

Gilbert Ryle’s ghost-in-the-machine argument, which is a rejection of Descartes' mind-body dualism can provide a contemporary understanding of the soul/mind, and the problem concerning its connection to the brain/body.

Selected and edited from Wikipedia

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       Clean up the above and post. – Amorella

       2118 hours. I am quite self-conscious of what I like to do “in my head”. I am embarrassed to show that I use my mind in the way I do. It is a private process. Merlyn would have read the classical philosophies, I have to show this in his character.

       Indeed. - Amorella

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