Mid-morning. Jill is coming to clean later
this morning so you and Carol will be off and away from the house for a few
hours. Basically, the everyday events including lunch out are the norm – moving
among the familiar haunts such as Kroger’s, Target/Walmart and Graeter’s every
couple of days or so. You have the coupon for Smashburgers for today if Carol
so chooses. Also, you have continued with your forty-minute plus exercises five
days a week and plan on continuing. You and Carol really use you Xmased Fitbits
in your daily routines. – Amorella
0848 minutes. I am thankful you
gave me a direction on Dead 11 last night even though at present I cannot
imagine how I’ll pull it off.
Delicious humor, huh? The kind you loved to
pull on your students several times a year. – Amorella
0850 hours. Put in this light, I
should say so myself. By the by, this morning while picking up the newspapers
from the driveways I kept saying a catchy phrase (a little ditty) that came out
of nowhere. Now I can’t remember what it was other that a reference to ‘light’
and ‘dark’ was a part.
You
are waiting for Carol who is walking laps at the community center. You found an
article that appears to be apropos to the definition of soul in your usage. –
Amorella
**
**
Supplement
to Aristotle's Psychology
A Question about the Metaphysics of Souls
In Section
10 of his exceptionally clear entry on Aristotle’s Metaphysics in this encyclopedia, S. Marc Cohen briefly recapitulates the
lively debate among Aristotelian commentators regarding the status of
particular forms in Aristotle.
As Cohen
notes, some things Aristotle says in his Metaphysics suggest that forms,
as substances, must be particulars; other things he says suggest that forms, as
objects of knowledge, must be universals.
If nothing
can be both a universal and a particular, then something must give: if
Aristotle is to avoid contradicting himself on a topic of such central
importance to his entire metaphysical system, then one set of textual data will
need to be subordinated to the other.
Cohen argues
with considerable force that it is particularity, which must give way: forms
are universals and, though they are substances, nothing said by Aristotle
entails that they are therefore particulars.
As Cohen
rightly reports, most of the data for this debate is drawn from Aristotle’s Metaphysics.
Consequently, any fully defensible argument on behalf of particular forms will
need to engage that data. Moreover, any such argument will also now need to
address Cohen’s lucid deployment of that data. Naturally, a discussion of
Aristotle’s psychology is not the place to conduct such a discussion.
Still, a
discussion of Aristotle’s psychology is just the place to reflect briefly on
the metaphysics of souls, because hylomorphism [the theory derived from
Aristotle that every physical object is composed of two principles, an
unchanging prime matter and a form deprived of actuality with every substantial
change of the object] finds its most nuanced and engaging expression in the
metaphysics of living beings.
To the
extent that this sort of discussion also has repercussions regarding the
problem of particular forms, it is also worth conducting any such inquiry with
an eye to the metaphysics of forms as such. This is especially so since some
things Aristotle says in the Metaphysics suggest that he restricts
substantiality to living beings, or, more weakly, that he regards living beings
as paradigmatic substances (Metaphysics viii 2, 1043a4–5; vii 17,
1041b21–3).
More to the
point, there is a simple argument drawn from the hylomorphic account of souls
and bodies in De Anima, which tells in favor of particular forms.
Although this argument does nothing to refute the arguments and interpretations
provided by Cohen and other detractors of particular forms, it does provide
some reason to wonder whether their arguments should be revisited. The argument is this: (i) the soul is a
form; (ii) the soul is something particular; therefore, (iii) there are particular
forms, namely souls.
As an
interpretation of Aristotle, the first premise of this argument cannot be in
doubt. Here is what he says: ‘It is
necessary, then, that the soul must be a substance as the form of a natural
body having life in potentiality’ (De Anima ii 1, 412a19–21). So
Aristotle regards the soul as a substance and as a form. It therefore follows
that he endorses the first premise (i) of our simple argument.
That leaves
only the second premise (ii), that souls are particulars, which detractors of
particular forms are consequently constrained to reject. There seem to be but
two ways of doing so: by treating souls as universals or by denying that a
distinction between universals and particulars is mutually exclusive and
exhaustive.
Neither alternative
looks especially attractive either in fact or as an interpretation of
Aristotle. (It should be said, however, that the second alternative has found
some surprisingly capable defenders among Aristotle’s exegetes, at least as
applied to forms generally, if not to souls more narrowly.)
Of course, some
of the direct linguistic evidence regarding the soul’s particularity is subject
to the same limitations as those appropriately noted by Cohen. If, for example,
it is implied that the soul is a tode ti (De Anima ii 1, 412a7–8),
then this may require its being some this, i.e. some particular thing,
or perhaps merely this something or other, i.e. something falling under
a sortal [*1. (Logic) – a concept, grasp of which includes knowledge of
criteria of individuation and reidentification; 2. (Logic) - a count noun
representing such a concept]
Since
universals too fall under sortals, perhaps as far as this linguistic data is
concerned, souls are conceivably universals. Parallel cases may be made about
other comparable locutions.
It seems
somehow unlikely, however, that when Aristotle claims that Socrates can be
identified with either a compound or a soul that he means to imply that ‘Socrates’
can be used to name a universal (Metaphysics vii 11, 1037a7; cf. Generation
of Animals iv 2–3, 767a20–768b1).
Moreover,
given the roles ascribed to it by Aristotle, there is some additional
philosophical reason for supposing that the soul is particular. If the soul is, for instance, the efficient cause
of motion (De Anima i 1, 403a24–b9; ii 4, 415b8, Partibus
Animalium i 1, 641a17–b10), then it seems responsible for the motion of an
individual body in a specific place and time.
Much the
same can be said for perception and thinking, where the perceptual and
intellectual activities of Socrates seem to be the activities of an individual,
situated in a peculiar place and time, and explained not by the presence of a
uniform universal, but by dint of there being individual psychological
faculties deployed on particular occasions.
In these
ways, it seems natural to understand Socrates’ soul to be numerically and
qualitatively distinct from Callias’ soul.
So it also
seems natural to think of their souls as particulars, rather than as a single
universal twice betokened.
These brief considerations are, of
course, in no way intended to prove that Aristotle commits himself to the
existence of particular forms.
They are, however, intended to
provide some prima facie evidence for that claim by showing what must be
denied if we are to understand him as resisting such a conclusion.
In short, those who find no commitment
to particular forms in Aristotle must also find in him no commitment to
particular souls.
**
Selected and edited from --http://plato.stanfordDOTedu/entries/aristotle-psychology/suppl2.html
*[Dictionary used] – The Free
Dictionary by Farlex
I separated (edited) the
paragraphs so that I may more easily follow the thought. I also placed the 'bold' as a reminder. - rho
**
**
You
spent much of the afternoon reading over another piece on ‘souls’ plus with
this longer article:
**
**
Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy
Metaphysics
First
published Mon Sep 10, 2007; substantive revision Fri Oct 31, 2014
It is not
easy to say what metaphysics is. Ancient and Medieval philosophers might have
said that metaphysics was, like chemistry or astrology, to be defined by its
subject matter: metaphysics was the “science” that studied “being as such” or
“the first causes of things” or “things that do not change”. It is no longer
possible to define metaphysics that way, for two reasons. First, a philosopher
who denied the existence of those things that had once been seen as
constituting the subject-matter of metaphysics—first causes or unchanging
things—would now be considered to be making thereby a metaphysical assertion.
Second, there are many philosophical problems that are now considered to be
metaphysical problems (or at least partly metaphysical problems) that are in no
way related to first causes or unchanging things—the problem of free will, for
example, or the problem of the mental and the physical.
The first
three sections of this entry examine a broad selection of problems considered
to be metaphysical and discuss ways in which the purview of metaphysics has
expanded over time. We shall see that the central problems of metaphysics were
significantly more unified in the Ancient and Medieval eras. Which raises a
question—is there any common feature that unites the problems of contemporary
metaphysics? The final two sections discuss some recent theories of the nature
and methodology of metaphysics. We will also consider arguments that
metaphysics, however defined, is an impossible enterprise.
Entry
Contents
•
1. The Word
‘Metaphysics’ and the Concept of Metaphysics
•
2. The Problems of
Metaphysics: the “Old” Metaphysics
2.1 Being As Such, First Causes,
Unchanging Things
2.2 Categories of Being and
Universals
2.3 Substance
•
3. The Problems of
Metaphysics: the “New” Metaphysics
3.1 Modality
3.2 Space and Time
3.3 Persistence and Constitution
3.4 Causation, Freedom and
Determinism
3.5 The Mental and Physical
•
4. The Methodology
of Metaphysics
•
5. Is Metaphysics
Possible?
•
Bibliography
•
Academic Tools
•
Other Internet
Resources
•
Related Entries
1. The Word ‘Metaphysics’ and the Concept
of Metaphysics
The word
‘metaphysics’ is notoriously hard to define. Twentieth-century coinages like
‘meta-language’ and ‘metaphilosophy’ encourage the impression that metaphysics
is a study that somehow “goes beyond” physics, a study devoted to matters that
transcend the mundane concerns of Newton and Einstein and Heisenberg. This
impression is mistaken. The word ‘metaphysics’ is derived from a collective
title of the fourteen books by Aristotle that we currently think of as making
up Aristotle's Metaphysics. Aristotle himself did not know the word. (He
had four names for the branch of philosophy that is the subject-matter of
Metaphysics: ‘first philosophy’, ‘first science’, ‘wisdom’, and ‘theology’.
**
Author and Citation Information for
"Metaphysics"
The
latest version of the entry "Metaphysics" may be
cited via the earliest archive in which this version appears:
van
Inwagen, Peter and Sullivan, Meghan, "Metaphysics", The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
URL = .
The
citation above refers to the version in the following archive edition:
•
Spring 2015
(minor correction)
•
Please note that you
are being asked to cite a URL that is in a fixed, archived edition of the
encyclopedia. The reason for this is that the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy recommends that readers cite a stable document for scholarly
purposes.
**
**
2038 hours.
I worked on the above 14,129 word article but it is copyrighted so I have about
450 words above. The article can easily be found online. Also, below is the
introduction of the article “Metaphysics” in Wikipedia. I find it too general
to pick and choose from.
**
**
Metaphysics
From
Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Metaphysics is a traditional branch of philosophy concerned with explaining
the fundamental nature of being and the world that encompasses it, although the
term is not easily defined. Traditionally, metaphysics attempts to answer two
basic questions in the broadest possible terms:
1
Ultimately,
what is there?
2
What is it
like?
A person
who studies metaphysics is called a metaphysician. The
metaphysician attempts to clarify the fundamental notions by which people
understand the world, e.g., existence, objects and their properties, space and
time, cause and effect, and possibility. A central branch of metaphysics is
ontology, the investigation into the basic categories of being and how they
relate to each other. Another central branch of metaphysics is cosmology, the
study of the origin, fundamental structure, nature, and dynamics of the
universe. Some include epistemology as another central focus of metaphysics,
but others question this.
Prior to the modern history of
science, scientific questions were addressed as a part of metaphysics known as
natural philosophy. Originally, the term "science" (Latin scientia)
simply meant "knowledge". The scientific method, however, transformed
natural philosophy into an empirical activity deriving from experiment unlike
the rest of philosophy. By the end of the 18th century, it had begun to be
called "science" to distinguish it from philosophy. Thereafter,
metaphysics denoted philosophical enquiry of a non-empirical character into the
nature of existence. Some philosophers of science, such as the neo-positivists,
say that natural science rejects the study of metaphysics, while other
philosophers of science strongly disagree.
Etymology
The word
"metaphysics" derives from the Greek words μετά (meta, "beyond", "upon" or "after")
and φυσικά (physiká, "physics"). It was first used as the
title for several of Aristotle's works, because they were usually anthologized
after the works on physics in complete editions. The prefix meta-
("after") indicates that these works come "after" the
chapters on physics. However, Aristotle himself did not call the subject of
these books "Metaphysics": he referred to it as "first
philosophy." The editor of Aristotle's works, Andronicus of Rhodes, is
thought to have placed the books on first philosophy right after another work, Physics,
and called them τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ βιβλία (ta meta ta physika biblia) or
"the books that come after the [books on] physics". This was misread
by Latin scholiasts, who thought it meant "the science of what is beyond
the physical".
However,
once the name was given, the commentators sought to find intrinsic reasons for
its appropriateness. For instance, it was understood to mean "the science
of the world beyond nature" (physis in Greek), that is, the science
of the immaterial. Again, it was understood to refer to the chronological or
pedagogical order among our philosophical studies, so that the
"metaphysical sciences" would mean "those that we study after
having mastered the sciences that deal with the physical world" (St.
Thomas Aquinas, Expositio in librum Boethii De hebdomadibus, V, 1).
There is a widespread use of the
term in current popular literature which replicates this understanding, i.e.
that the metaphysical equates to the non-physical: thus, "metaphysical
healing" means healing by means of remedies that are not physical.
Selected and edited from
Wikipedia
**
**
Below are
further general notes on the ‘soul’ from Wikipedia. I am troubled that I cannot
document more of notes in the posting but I have backup information over the
years – the point is that I want to create a segment that follows through with
what many believe the soul to be but also I want it open enough for my own interpretation
within the Merlyn fiction. Plausibility is the key. I want the work to be
realistic and open to discussion. I want the reader to think and consider as
well as to energize her or his imagination.
Orndorff, you are only writing between seven
hundred and eight hundred words in the segment. – Amorella
2115 hours. I will have thought
this out first. I’m not looking for perfection but I want to make this work for
solid thinking for student thinkers of all mature ages, ages 16/18 on.
**
**
Soul
From Wikipedia, the free
encyclopedia
The soul
in many religions, philosophical and mythological traditions, is the
incorporeal and immortal essence of a living being. According to
Abrahamic religions, only human beings have immortal souls. For example, the
Catholic theologian Thomas Aquinas attributed "soul" (anima) to all
organisms but argued that only human souls are immortal. Other religions (most
notably Jainism and Hinduism) teach that all biological organisms have souls,
while some teach that even non-biological entities (such as rivers and
mountains) possess souls. This latter belief is called animism.
Greek
philosophers such as Socrates, Plato and Aristotle understood that the psyche (ψυχή) must have a logical
faculty, the exercise of which was the most divine of human actions. At his
defense trial, Socrates even summarized his teaching as nothing other than an
exhortation for his fellow Athenians to excel in matters of the psyche since
all bodily goods are dependent on such excellence (The Apology 30a–b).
Anima mundi is the
concept of a "world soul" connecting all living organisms on the
planet.
Etymology
The
Modern English word “soul”, derived from Old English sáwol, sáwel, was
first attested in the 8th-century poem Beowulf
v. 2820 and in the Vespasian Psalter 77.50. It is cognate with other German and
Baltic terms for the same idea, including Gothic saiwala, Old High
German sêula, sêla, Old Saxon sêola, Old Low Franconian sêla,
sîla, Old Norse sála and Lithuanian siela. Further etymology
of the Germanic word is uncertain. The original concept is meant to be 'coming
from or belonging to the sea/lake', because of the German belief in souls being
born out of and returning to sacred lakes, Old Saxon sêola (soul)
compared to Old Saxon sêo (sea).
The
Koine Greek word ψυχή
psyche, "life, spirit, consciousness", is derived
from a verb meaning "to cool, to blow", and hence refers to the
breath, as opposed to σῶμα ("soma"), meaning "body". Psychē
occurs juxtaposed to σῶμα, as seen in Matthew 10:28 . . .
Vulgate: et
nolite timere eos qui occidunt corpus animam autem non possunt occidere sed
potius eum timete qui potest et animam et corpus perdere in gehennam.
Authorized
King James Version (KJV) "And fear not them which kill the body, but are
not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul
and body in hell."
In the
Septuagint (LXX), ψυχή translates Hebrew נפש nephesh, meaning
"life, vital breath", and specifically refers to a mortal, physical
life, but is in English variously translated as "soul, self, life,
creature, person, appetite, mind, living being, desire, emotion, passion";
an example can be found in Genesis 1:20: . . .
Vulgate Creavitque
Deus cete grandia, et omnem animam viventem atque motabilem.
KJV
"And God created great whales, and every living creature that
moveth."
. . .
Philosophical
views
The
Ancient Greeks used the word "alive" for the concept of being “ensouled”,
indicating that the earliest surviving western philosophical view believed that
the soul was that which gave the body life. The soul was considered the
incorporeal or spiritual "breath" that animates (from the Latin, anima, cf. "animal") the
living organism. Francis M. Cornford quotes Pindar by saying that the soul
sleeps while the limbs are active, but when one is sleeping, the soul is active
and reveals "an award of joy or sorrow drawing near" in dreams. Erwin
Rohde writes that an early pre-Pythagorean belief presented the soul as
lifeless when it departed the body, and that it retired into Hades with no hope
of returning to a body.
Socrates
and Plato
Drawing
on the words of his teacher Socrates, Plato considered the psyche to be the
essence of a person, being that which decides how we behave. He considered this
essence to be an incorporeal, eternal occupant of our being. Socrates says that
even after death, the soul exists and is able to think. He believed that as
bodies die, the soul is continually reborn in subsequent bodies and Plato
believed this as well, however, he thought that only one part of the soul was
immortal (logos).
The
Platonic soul consists of three parts:
•
the logos,
or logistikon (mind, nous, or reason)
•
the thymos, or thumetikon (emotion,
spiritedness, or masculine)
•
the eros, or epithumetikon
(appetitive, desire, or feminine)
•
The
parts are located in different regions of the body:
•
logos is located in the head, is related to reason and regulates the
other part.
•
thymos is located near the chest region and is related to anger.
•
eros is located in the stomach and is related to one's desires.
•
Plato
also compares the three parts of the soul or psyche to a societal caste system.
According to Plato's theory, the three-part soul is essentially the same thing
as a state's class system because, to function well, each part must contribute
so that the whole functions well. Logos keeps the other functions of the soul
regulated.
Aristotle
Aristotle
(384 BC – 322 BC) defined the soul, or Psūchê (ψυχή), as the “first
actuality” of a naturally organized body, and argued against its separate
existence from the physical body. In Aristotle's view, the primary activity, or
full actualization, of a living thing constitutes its soul. For example, the
full actualization of an eye, as an independent organism, is to see (its
purpose or final cause). Another example is that the full actualization of a human being
would be living a fully functional human life in accordance with reason (which
he considered to be a faculty unique to humanity). For Aristotle, the soul is
the organization of the form and matter of a natural being which allows it to
strive for its full actualization. This organization between form and matter is
necessary for any activity, or functionality, to be possible in a natural
being. Using an artifact (non-natural being) as an example, a house is a
building for human habituation, but for a house to be actualized requires the
material (wood, nails, bricks, etc.) necessary for its actuality (i.e. being a
fully functional house). However, this does not imply that a house has a soul.
In regards to artifacts, the source of motion that is required for their full
actualization is outside of themselves (for example, a builder builds a house).
In natural beings, this source of motion is contained within the being itself.
Aristotle elaborates on this point when he addresses the faculties of the soul.
The
various faculties of the soul, such as nutrition, movement (peculiar to
animals), reason (peculiar to humans), sensation (special, common, and
incidental) and so forth, when exercised, constitute the "second"
actuality, or fulfillment, of the capacity to be alive. For example, someone
who falls asleep, as opposed to someone who falls dead, can wake up and live
[her/his] life, while the latter can no longer do so.
Aristotle
identified three hierarchical levels of natural beings: plants, animals, and
people. For these groups, he identified three corresponding levels of soul, or
biological activity: the nutritive activity of growth, sustenance and
reproduction which all life shares; the self-willed motive activity and sensory
faculties, which only animals and people have in common; and finally
"reason", of which people alone are capable.
Aristotle's
discussion of the soul is in his work, De
Anima (On the Soul). Although mostly seen as opposing Plato in
regard to the immortality of the soul, a controversy can be found in relation
to the fifth chapter of the third book. In this text both interpretations can
be argued for, soul as a whole can be deemed mortal and a part called
"active intellect" or "active mind" is immortal and eternal.
Advocates exist for both sides of the controversy, but it has been understood
that there will be permanent disagreement about its final conclusions, as no
other Aristotelian text contains this specific point, and this part of De
Anima is obscure.
Avicenna
and Ibn al-Nafis
Following
Aristotle, Avicena (Ibn Sina) and Ibn al-Nafis, a Persian philosopher, further
elaborated upon the Aristotelian understanding of the soul and developed their
own theories on the soul. They both made a distinction between the soul and the
spirit, and the Avicennian doctrine on the nature of the soul was influential
among the Scholastics. Some of Avicenna's views on the soul include the idea
that the immortality of the soul is a consequence of its nature, and not a
purpose for it to fulfill. In his theory of "The Ten Intellects", he
viewed the human soul as the tenth and final intellect.
While he
was imprisoned, Avicenna wrote his famous "Floating Man" thought
experiment to demonstrate human self-awareness and the substantial nature of
the soul. He told his readers to imagine themselves suspended in the air,
isolated from all sensations, which includes no sensory contact with even their
own bodies. He argues that in this scenario one would still have
self-consciousness. He thus concludes that the idea of the self is not
logically dependent on any physical thing, and that the soul should not be seen
in relative terms, but as a primary given, a substance. This argument was later
refined and simplified by Rene Descartes in epistemic terms, when he stated:
"I can abstract from the supposition of all external things, but not from
the supposition of my own consciousness.”
Avicenna
generally supported Aristotle's idea of the soul originating from the heart,
whereas Ibn al-Nafis rejected this idea and instead argued that the soul
"is related to the entirety and not to one or a few organs”. He further
criticized Aristotle's idea whereby every unique soul requires the existence of
a unique source, in this case the heart. al-Nafis concluded that "the soul
is related primarily neither to the spirit nor to any organ, but rather to the
entire matter whose temperament is prepared to receive that soul," and he
defined the soul as nothing other than "what a human indicates by saying “I”.
Thomas
Aquinas
Following
Aristotle and Avicenna, Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) understood the soul to be the
first actuality of the living body. Consequent to this, he distinguished three
orders of life: plants, which feed and grow; animals, which add sensation to
the operations of plants; and humans, which add intellect to the operations of
animals.
Concerning
the human soul, his epistemological theory required that, since the knower
becomes what he knows, the soul is definitely not corporeal—if it is corporeal
when it knows what some corporeal thing is, that thing would come to be within
it. Therefore, the soul has an
operation, which does not rely on a body organ, and therefore the soul could
can exist without a body. Furthermore, since the rational soul of human beings
is a subsistent form and not something made of matter and form, it cannot be destroyed
in any natural process. The full argument for the immortality of the soul and
Aquinas' elaboration of Aristotelian theory is found in Question 75 of the
Summa Theologica.
Immanuel
Kant
In his
discussions of rational psychology, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) identified the
soul as the "I" in the strictest sense, and that the existence of
inner experience can neither be proved nor disproved. "We cannot prove a
priori the immateriality of the soul, but rather only so much: that all
properties and actions of the soul cannot be recognized from materiality".
It is from the "I", or soul, that Kant proposes transcendental
rationalization, but cautions that such rationalization can only determine the
limits of knowledge if it is to remain practical.
Philosophy
of mind
Gilbert
Ryle’s ghost-in-the-machine argument, which is a rejection of Descartes'
mind-body dualism can provide a contemporary understanding of the soul/mind,
and the problem concerning its connection to the brain/body.
Selected
and edited from Wikipedia
**
**
Clean up the above and post. – Amorella
2118 hours. I am quite
self-conscious of what I like to do “in my head”. I am embarrassed to show that
I use my mind in the way I do. It is a private process. Merlyn would have read the
classical philosophies, I have to show this in his character.
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