You had your semi-annual doctor's appointment in the AM; all went well. Jill is cleaning today so you and Carol are at Barnes and Noble in West Chester presently. Errands and lunch coming up. You found another recent sunset photo from Madeira Beach. You posted on FB and are getting a positive response with one share. Here it is. - Amorella
Madeira
Beach, Florida June, 2017
You are reflecting on water vapor and blue sky sharpened in the light. Post. - Amorella
Former student Cathy sees Winnie-the-Pooh while former student David sees Mickey in the lower line cloud formation. You are delighted as you saw neither and had titled the photograph on your iPhone 6, "Thoughts". This brings up another read you took from Edge dot org. An article that shows some aspects of how the 'real' world works in terms of digital marketing as well as how it is for individuals living in such a world.
** **
Edge
July 10, 2017
THE THIRD CULTURE
Things to Hang on Your Mental Mug Tree
A Conversation With Roy Sutherland
BIO - RORY SUTHERLAND is Vice-Chairman of Ogilvy London. He
writes the Spectator’s "Wiki
Man" column, and he serves on the advisory board of The Evolution
Institute.
In 2012
Sutherland was awarded a prestigious 25th anniversary IDM Honorary Fellowship
at the Institute’s flagship event, the IDM Annual Lecture. Rory received the
IDM’s only 2012 Honorary Fellowship award for his outstanding contribution to
the direct and digital marketing profession.
***
Things to Hang on Your Mental Mug Tree
On
a list of ten things that matter in terms of how you look at the world,
satisficing would be number one, along with the whole business of decision
making under uncertainty. This opens up the idea that something which may seem
at first glance to be completely irrational may in fact be a useful and highly
effective non-catastrophic heuristic.
At
around the same time as Herbert Simon was doing his work, David Ogilvy was
talking to someone who ran the Chicago office of Ogilvy called Joel Raphaelson
[Joel, who is still alive and as quick-minded as a 25-year-old, is the son of
Sampson Raphaelson, scriptwriter for The Jazz Singer and Heaven Can
Wait]. David agreed with Joel’s idea that people bought brands to avoid
badness rather than to maximise perfection. They bought brand A over brand B
not because they thought it was better, but because they were more certain it
was good.
The
idea is that when you make decisions in an uncertain setting, you have to care
about not only the expected outcome, but also the possible variance. We'll pay
a premium not only for "better", but for "less likely to be
terrible". That seems to be an important thing to understand when
analysing decision
making.
Human
decision making is also pretty path-dependent. In one case in my life I've been
able to profit from this. I live in a house, which in the UK is something
called Grade 1 listed. It's by the great eighteenth century Robert Adam, and
the grounds are by Capability Brown. I'm in a four bedroom flat on the roof of
a house built for the doctor of George III in about 1785. For a time it was the
home of Napoleon III.
I
didn't pay anything extra for the architecture or the genius of the landscaping
because nobody places that very high on their list of priorities when they buy
a house. I asked our next-door neighbour, an economist, how much he thought we
paid for this property relative to a property in an identical location of the
same size by an indifferent architect. In other words, what's the premium we
pay for the Robert Adam-ness of it? He said somewhere between zero and about 5
percent.
That's
quite interesting if you think about it. When we buy a property, the order in
which we look at things places location as the highest priority. ]Next. In the
UK, might be the number of bedrooms it has (in the US, it might be the floor
area, by square footage). We might then look at the size of the garden, a few
other features, and whether it has a pool. But architecture generally comes
pretty low down the list. We only look at architectural aesthetics when we've
got down to a final selection of four or five.
Whereas
a painting by a great artist might cost literally 10,000 times more than an
equivalent-sized painting by an indifferent artist, a building by a fantastic
architect costs about 1-3 percent more than a building by an average or even
indifferent architect.
If
we bought paintings the way we bought property, we'd say, "I want a
painting that's exactly this size; I want these three colors to predominate; I
want it to be in exactly these proportions." In the fifth iteration or so,
we'd get down to who the artist was. Most of the time, we wouldn't end up with
a Picasso. It seems to me that architecture is an incredibly cheap way of
buying art, compared to art.
If
you're interested and want to take advantage of this, go to a website in the US
called savewright.org, which shows Frank Lloyd Wright properties
for sale. In most cases, they seem to be no more expensive than the neighboring
property. Similarly, there was a Gropius flat that came for sale in the UK. It
was expensive because it was in Notting Hill, but no more expensive than a
totally average building next door. What intrigues me about human decision
making is that there seems to be a path-dependence involved - to which we are
completely blind.
Number
two? Costly signaling theory is also pretty useful. I suppose the peacock's
tail is the standard view. What seems undoubtedly true is that humans, like
peahens, attach significance to a piece of communication in some way
proportionally to the cost of generating or transmitting it. Instinctively, you
will open the FedEx package on your desk before you open the letter. One of the
problems of email is there's no cost attached to sending it, so we don't have a
useful heuristic for deciding what to read first. That strikes me as interesting.
Cost
might mean anything from financial expense to use of a scarce resource—anything
that requires something in scarce supply, whether it's money, talent, effort,
or time. The more that is invested in the communication, essentially, the more
weight that communication carries. That makes perfect sense because, in some
ways, that means that your sincerity is hard or costly to fake. That could also
apply to creativity - the effort required to communicate humourously, which you
have invested up front, connotes something about the sender’s intent.
Let
me give you an example. You receive two wedding invitations on the same day,
one of which comes in an expensive envelope with gilt edges and embossing, and
the other, which contains exactly the same information, is in the shape of an
email. You're probably going to go to the first wedding. (The second one, well,
there's a dangerous implication there might be a cash bar.) Now, what happens
if you haven't got much money, but you want to do an impactful wedding invitation?
Then you make it really creative.
If
you can't put actual money into the paper or the printing. What you can put in
is something different, which is imagination. You can make it a fantastically
imaginative or beautiful [or humorous] wedding invitation.
But
there has to be some investment of a scarce, costly thing. It's the difference
between saying your horse is going to win and visibly betting on your horse. In
the latter case, you have skin in the game; in the former case, you don't.
That's important to understand. To some extent, effective communication will
always require some degree of inefficiency because if it's perfectly
inefficient, it then becomes meaningless.
There's
a rather lovely company in the UK that pays people who are housebound—whether
for medical reasons, or are caregivers—to handwrite envelopes and letters. You
could regard this as a very silly thing to do, but in costly signaling theory
terms, it makes perfect sense. The open rate of these letters, and the response
they generate, is an order of magnitude higher than for laser-printed letters.
Another
thing worth bearing in mind is countersignaling, which, unlike signaling, seems
to be uniquely human. There aren't cases of peacocks who demonstrate their
extraordinary genetic quality by having really shitty tails. What seems to
happen with humans is you have multiple parallel status currencies, and quite
often you will signal your position on status by adopting none of the status
currencies of the class immediately below your own, or by essentially
demonstrating zero effort in standard status currencies. An unwashed bass
guitarist in a cool rock band, for example, can get away with poor levels of
hygiene, which signals: "I'm so sexy by dint of my bass guitar playing
skills that I can get away with not making an effort in any of these
conventional areas." Sometimes it's done as a positional thing, and
sometimes it's done as a pure demonstration of handicap.
Relevance
theory [from Dan Sperber and Deidre Wilson] might be another thing that's
interesting. In other words, replacing the “conduit” idea of communication with
this idea that we communicate the minimum necessary for the recipient to
recreate the message within their own head using context as a very large part
of the information. Those interesting new theories of communication, which
don't always sit with the Claude Shannon theories, are worth exploring. A very
simple manifestation would be jokes which, like IKEA furniture, demand some
self-assembly on the part of the recipient.
…..quite
a lot of advertising works heavily on the basis that 10 percent of it is
information, and the rest of it is inference. I suppose that's the way to put
it. We will understand the communication very differently depending on context.
The
general idea of advertising is that it manipulates people into liking things
more than they should. Now, I'll dispute that. I completely agree with various
psychologists who point out that marketers undoubtedly exploit attentional
bias. The only defense I'll make is that we will exhibit attentional bias
anyway if left to our own devices. Changing what people pay attention to, and
what people think of as important is quite useful in terms of any form of
innovation. Most significant innovations effectively operate by ignoring the
established rules of a category and creating some new rules somewhere else.
This often requires a shift in the consumer’s attention from the strength of
the old thing to the strength of the new thing that replaces it.
There
was a period where the whole gig about mobile phones was about miniaturization,
how small they were. That reached levels of absurdity, literally, the reductio
ad absurdum, where phones were so small you could hardly retrieve them from
your pocket. Eventually, people stopped paying attention to smallness, and
marketers encouraged them to pay attention to usability and large screen size -
you now pay more for a bigger phone. We stopped paying attention to one thing,
and we started using a different heuristic. Marketing, in some ways, makes
markets more dynamic by preventing people being fixated for too long on any one
particular dimension of comparison.
An
interesting example, which suggests there's a large amount of inference and
context that goes into our contextual, metacognitive interpretation of
advertising, is that in Eastern Europe under communism, if you advertised a
product, demand often went down.
Why
was this? If advertising works as we conventionally think it does, without
contextual translation, how on earth can that happen?
But,
under communism, anything that was worthwhile or desirable was generally in
short supply. Consumers inferred that the only possible reason that the
government might be promoting something was that they'd accidentally managed to
produce something of such unremitting crappiness that people weren't willing to
queue for it. Advertising in that context told you what not to buy.
The
conventional view of advertising is that when you say something is good,
perceived value rises. In fact, you could argue that quite a lot of advertising
is a reliable “costly signal” because you wouldn't do it if you had a bad
product.
It's
an expensive activity, which disproportionately pays back when it’s for
something that becomes widely and repeatedly popular over time, but leads to
disproportionate losses when you are selling something where customer
satisfaction and hence repeat purchase are going to be low.
In
other words, it's a sunk-cost demonstration of faith in what you're selling,
which is sincere precisely because there's a cost attached.
We
need to be alert to this because there's a move in advertising to make it more
efficient by making it all digital. Arguably, when you make it more efficient
and less costly, you make it less convincing.
We
shouldn’t forget that traditional mass advertising has the virtue of taking
place in a mass medium. A promise you make to multiple people simultaneously is
a bigger bet than making a promise to one individual at a time. When we get
married, we state our vows in a crowded church full of 200 people rather than
going door to door reading out our vows to people one at a time. In a mass
setting, only one person has got to call your bluff and you've lost. It shows
instinctively more confidence to make a promise in a public space than it does
to make it one person at a time.
All
I am saying is that we have to be careful, when we obsess about the newly
efficient digital modes of advertising, that we aren't throwing away the baby
with the bathwater.
If
you take programmatic digital banners, displays, you might be reaching exactly
the same audience as a TV ad does. But if you're creating a lower level of
conviction in that same audience, what you're doing may appear to be efficient,
but it's less effective. Costly signaling is one of those mental tools you
can't do without.
Okay,
mug number five. Nassim Taleb is very interesting on the Lindy effect. He
believes that if you have a worthwhile finding in social science or psychology,
you will find mention of it going back to the ancient world. You might argue
that Aesop's "The Fox and the Grapes" is an early instance of
avoiding regret. (Aesop was an early behavioural economist, in some ways).
I
had an interesting conversation about this with HMRC (Her Majesty’s Revenue
& Customs), the people who do taxation in the UK [and the same wonderful
folks who gave you the Boston Tea Party]. My contention is that when you give
people information - or a choice - that contains a bit of bad and a bit of
good, or even quite a lot of bad and a little bit of good, the natural human
reaction is to amplify the good and minimize the bad.
Sometimes
the opposite of sour grapes is called sweet lemons. Sweet lemons is when we
say, "Yes, I did spend three years in prison, but if I hadn't had that
time in prison, I never would've met those interesting people and had such a
formative experience." We take things that perhaps a more objective person
would think of as unremittingly awful, and we construct a little bit of a
positive out of it.
I
explained to the tax people that the way tax is done, where there is absolutely
no tradeoff, it provides us with no means of performing that mental trick. Now,
try to imagine that if by paying more income tax, you got a small amount of a
token benefit. For example, let's say that when you pay more income tax at age
thirty, it might increase your inheritance tax threshold—the amount you could
pass on to people—or your base level tax rate in retirement would go up a
little bit - just some small upside. Would we hate paying tax a lot less?
Let
me tell you a little bit about providing people with the opportunity to
construct a more positive story. In ancient Rome and Greece, they did this. If
you paid wealth tax, you got your name on a column, honoring your contribution.
There was now some reputational upside.
In
fact, it worked so well that people came out of the woodwork and said,
"You haven't asked me to pay this wealth tax, and I'm much wealthier than
him. I should be on the column, too." This is an example of a status benefit,
but there are other benefits that you can write into a narrative involving
trade-off.
The
most extraordinary thing happened to me, which suddenly made this Aesop point
very well. Aesop is what, 7th century BC? It's a comfortable two-and-a-half
thousand years old as an insight, so it's stood the test of time….
Okay,
so I'm landing in an Easyjet plane. Normally, when you get a bus to the
terminal, you're really pissed off. You say, "Dammit, I'm being
shortchanged here. I was expecting an air bridge, and you're going to drive me
to the terminal in a ruddy bus." Generally, everybody's kind of spitting
and angry.
But,
in this case, the pilot said something extraordinary.
He
says something I've never heard before. Instead of saying, "I'm terribly
sorry, we haven't been able to get an air bridge, so you'll be bused to the
terminal. If you just wait while the bus draws up on the port side of the
aircraft—" No. Instead, he says, "I've got some bad news and I've got
some good news. The bad news is we haven't been able to get an air bridge
because there's a plane blocking our gate. The good news is that the bus will
take you right next to passport control, so you won't have far to walk with
your bags."
Suddenly,
I realized that actually that's always true. When you get a bus, there's an
upside to the bus, which is you don't have a long walk through a shopping
center with your carry-on luggage in order to get to passport control and then
the baggage carousel. But because no one had brought our attention to it, we had
no opportunity to derive the positive.
Here's
a little social science experiment everybody can do: The next time there's a
bus and they simply announce, "I'm afraid we'll have to bus you to the
terminal building," say quite loudly, "I'm pleased there's a bus
because the bus drives you all the way to passport control so you don't have to
walk there with your bags." You will have synthesized a dose of happiness
among everybody within earshot without changing objective reality at all simply
by changing the way that people look at something.
I
thought that pilot was a genius because there always was an upside to the bus,
but because bus replacement services on trains are always widely hated, we
never even assumed there was one to find. The second it was pointed out to us,
our attitude to having a bus is completely changed.
This
comes down to Robert Cialdini’s argument in his book Pre-Suasion,
which is about the fact that we automatically assume that what we pay
attention to is what's important. Another valuable concept is Daniel Kahneman’s
dictum that “nothing is as important as we think it is while we're thinking
about it.”
There's
a value to marketing. This is a very strange, and some people might say
massively self-interested defense of marketing, but it's perfectly possible to
create value not by changing the material world at all, but simply by changing
the way we direct our attention or the way attention is directed.
In
environmental terms, you can say this has rather a lot of potential. If you can
change people's focus, attention, and their status currencies so they derive
more pleasure from what already exists, rather than from what has to be created
to sate their demands, you can essentially increase wealth without increasing
consumption. That seems to me a rather important finding. One of the dangerous
assumptions of economics, among many, is that because they assume that we are
already blessed with perfect information, perfect trust, and they assume that
we are already making optimal use of the money we have, the only way in which
you can increase wellbeing—according to economic assumptions—is essentially by
burning more things.
I'd
argue that intangible value, once you learn to respect it, shows that you can
make people very content with less. Think about it. A Prius is a reasonably
high status car. It's an interesting car, the Prius, in the sense that…. you
probably have to be a bit of a liberal to get away with this; I don't think
this works in Texas….. but a megastar can turn up at the Oscars in a Prius and
no one would think there was anything remotely weird about it.
If
you generally define wealth not in purely financial terms, but in the number of
choices people can freely and enjoyably make….. well, by essentially enabling
people to have a modest car without any stigma being attached to it, that's a
pretty useful thing you've just done in terms of wealth creation.
I
don't think there's any huge amount of intelligence required to look at the
world through different lenses. The difficulty lies in that you have to abandon
four or five assumptions about the world simultaneously. That's what probably
makes it difficult.
~ ~ ~
One
essential problem is exactly the same in the private sector, the public sector,
or indeed, the charitable sector, which is that most decisions are made in a
risk-averse manner. In most jobs, there's an asymmetric reward mechanism. If
you do something well, you get a pat on the back. If anything goes disastrously
wrong, you lose your job.
Very
simply, in individual decision making, we are very strongly motivated by fear
of regret. In collective decision making, in institutional
decision making—in business or in government—the thing that drives us is fear
of blame. Cleaving to a narrow, simplified rational model is usually a
good way to protect yourself against blame.
I
have a simple mantra here, which is that it's far easier to be fired for being
illogical than it is for being unimaginative. If you make a decision that
proves to be disastrous but it is based on solid, logical foundations, you keep
your job. If you make a decision that may be a better decision on average but
involves a degree of counterintuitive thinking, second-order thinking, or
indeed, a degree of subjectivity….. well, if it goes well, you won't get much
more credit than you would using the logical approach. If it goes wrong, you're
now out of a job, you're vilified.
Gerd
Gigerenzer calls this defensive decision making. That is a useful thing to
understand. In medicine it probably leads to massive over intervention. (It's
much easier to get sued for not doing something than it is for doing
something). This defensiveness creates extraordinary distortions of decision
making.
What
happens is that, unconsciously, we're not thinking “what's the best decision
here”. What our instincts tell us to do is to choose whatever course in which
the worst-case scenario is least catastrophic for us personally. That's one of
the reasons why business meetings proliferate to such an extent, which is that
it's a way of burying decision making in the collective, rather than forcing
any one individual to take responsibility.
One
thing which emerges from this is habit and groupthink. When people choose very
conventionally, the consequences of failure are less catastrophic. The downside
risk of a bad decision is proportional to how weird it is.
This
is probably why there are four big accounting firms. If you appoint one of the
big four and something goes wrong, people will blame, say, Price Waterhouse. If
you appoint a small boutique accounting firm (which might be faster, cheaper,
and better in most objective measures) if anything goes wrong, they'll now
blame you because you've taken a nonstandard decision.
That
very strong drive to conformity and risk avoidance probably explains the
necessity of entrepreneurs in a business sense, the kind of people who aren't
constrained by that institutional thinking.
But
it's also something to be alert to in understanding how people decide.
Government and business will both tend to play it too safe. They are all
operating under certain norms or assumptions that are safely traditional, yet
some of which are probably wrong. Neoclassical economics creates one such
template, which risk averse people can always cling to because no one will
ever get fired for assuming that economics is true. Make decisions assuming
complete economic rationality in all actors and, even when it’s a terrible
decision, your jobs safe.
Let's
imagine you want to compete with Coca-Cola. You're thinking that for about 150
years it has been the most popular cold, nonalcoholic drink - other than water
- anywhere in the world. We want some of that action. You go in and you say,
"We need to produce a drink that tastes nicer than Coke, costs less than
Coke, and comes in a big bottle so people will get great value for money."
No one in that meeting is going to say, "That sounds pretty wack."
Everyone is going to nod along.
So
you research the drink, and it does indeed research better than Coke. You've
reduced the price. All of those things seem wonderful. You will never lose your
job for doing that, even when the tasty, cheap, voluminous drink is a total
failure in the market..
The
only problem with this is the most successful attempt to compete with Coke in
the last fifty years is Red Bull. This costs a fortune, comes in a tiny can,
and it tastes disgusting. Patently, the psychological processes at work here
are not the same psychological processes that would be assumed by a first-year
economist.
(I
suspect there's something going on with the placebo effect there, which is that
in order for us to think that something has psychotropic or medicinal powers,
it has to taste a bit weird. Health food basically tastes a bit shit, doesn't
it? Wheatgrass is like licking the underside of your lawnmower. We tend to
infer there's a trade-off in these things—that if it's going to have
psychotropic or medicinal effects, there's going to be a downside somewhere. We
believe in Red Bull’s energy-boosting powers in a way that we wouldn't
believe from a nicer tasting drink.
There
are some interesting opportunities for entrepreneurs in taking a product and
adding a negative. Green tea is a possible example; we believe it’s wholesome
because it tastes weird.
~ ~ ~
You
probably know the work that Shlomo Benartzi has done on the Save More Tomorrow
Pension, which is effectively a case where you take two pensions that should be
economically identical, if we were indeed homo economicus, and yet
the rate of uptake on Shlomo's pension, although it “costs” exactly the same,
is two or three times greater. The amount saved is also greater.
This
new, evolved-brain-friendly pension is ingeniously designed it so that, rather
than paying a fixed amount, a proportion of all your pay rises go into a
pension. That way you never get poorer through having a pension, you just get
richer slower. Now, to economists, those two states are identical. In our
real-world human brains, however, for fairly obvious evolutionary reasons, we
feel losses more acutely than we enjoy gains.
One
of the great mistakes that the British pension policy has made is that it
hasn't set a low enough limit on how much we can save. That seems completely
counterintuitive—the idea that people would save more if there was a maximum
amount that you could save.
But,
in reality, we are rivalrous creatures that probably compare our savings to
each other, and the limit would set an implicit norm. If we saved wel below our
limit, we would feel we are missing out. And a limit would set an implicit
target. We might not save up to the limit, we might say, "Well, I better
do at least half," whereas having no limit provides no anchor point.
I
have some evidence to suggest that I might be right on this theory. There is a
British savings product, which is called the ISA. It used to be called the PEP.
That does have a maximum (it is going up to £20,000 this year). What was
remarkable is that a very large number of people saved in ISA, and what they
saved would tend to be either the whole amount or a fraction of the maximum
amount allowed. But economics won't get you there because it's only a very
partial explanation of human motivation. Economics is the study of human
motivation but with all the interesting variables set to zero, other than greed
or prudence. Everything else is set to zero.
~ ~ ~
Taleb's
recent work on the minority rule is fascinating. This interests me as a
marketer. Whereas we tend to think that markets are the result of aggregated
preferences, actually, a small minority of people who veto something can have a
surprisingly large effect on a marketplace if the people who are non-vetoers
are happy to go along with a universally acceptable alternative.
So,
if you have a school in the UK where 5 percent of the pupils are Muslim, the
whole kitchen will go halal. Why? Because non-Muslims don't mind eating halal
food. Muslims will only eat halal food. As a result, the convenient thing is to
have one kitchen that can serve everybody, so everybody eats halal. (Slightly
unfair to Sikhs, incidentally, who aren't supposed to eat halal food, but they
don't seem to make much fuss about it.)
Similarly,
if you have a party that is more exclusively male, you can almost be certain
that the default drink is beer. However, if you have a mixed-gender party,
something new enters the equation. About 18 to 20 percent, maybe as many as 30
percent of women won't drink beer under any circumstances. Men, however will,
without much encouragement, drink pretty much anything.
Therefore,
if you have a group that is 50-50 female-male, and let's say 20 percent of the
entire group won't drink beer, everybody has wine. It's the type O negative,
the universal donor. Pizza is probably very popular as a foodstuff because
nobody really hates it.
Understanding
that complex systems like consumer markets sometimes have slightly
counterintuitive rules to them is a useful thing.
With
regard to government, I don't think we've yet satisfactorily made the case for
why nudging is preferable to, say, legislation or using economic incentives. We
need to make this case again and again. Let me give you a very simple example
here. Let's say you use the price mechanism to get people to use their gas and electricity
late at night rather than during the day.
You
have several tariffs on a smart meter, and you charge people a lot more for
daytime electricity use than you do for electricity use in the evening.
Therefore, people are incentivized to put their tumble dryers, their washing
machines, and their dishwashers on in the evening rather than the middle of the
day. This generally reduces peaks in demand in the network. That then reduces
the number of dirty power stations that have to be switched on at times of peak
demand. Generally, that's a victory in terms of carbon emissions.
But
I would argue that the problem with using the price mechanism or legislation is
that they are universal blunt instruments. There are an enormous number of
cases where you don’t need to change everyone’s behaviour - you just need
enough people to change to make the system more effective. You don’t need
everyone to become nocturnal launderers - just enough to take away the worst of
the daytime peaks.
Setting
doctors' appointments would be another case where nudging could be optimal.
One, it's unacceptable to use the price mechanism in the UK because it's an
item of religious faith in the UK that we don't pay to visit the doctor. But it
would be preferable if retired people or people who didn't work went to the
doctor in the middle of the day so people in jobs could visit the doctor at
either end of the day before they went to work or after they got home. You
could achieve this easily with gentle nudging by appointment bookers.
Now,
the thing about using the price mechanism is that in some cases, it's
unacceptable. It's also unfair to certain groups. If you take the group of
people I was talking about, who you're encouraging to use their dishwashers
late in the evening, it's a nice idea, but it's also unfair to people who work
nights. The great thing about persuasion, versus pricing or legislation, is
that - if you have a good reason not to play ball, you’re free to go your own
way.
If
you take persuasion rather than compulsion, for example, with organ donation,
there will always be 5 percent of people who for some reason or other object to
what you want them to do. They may have perfectly good reasons. In the case of
organ donation, it may be religious. Certain religions believe you have to keep
all your organs intact after death. I don't necessarily think you're right to
believe that, but I respect your belief. If you nudge people, everybody has an
out. If you fine people, you end up punishing a load of people who may have
perfectly good individual reasons for objecting to your intended direction of
behavioral shift.
Essentially,
you should try persuasion first, bribery second, and legislation third. What
tends to happen in government, because it's their natural mode of approach, is
they tend to use legislation first before they've even tried persuasion. The
point is that legislation is a blunter instrument than persuasion. One of the
beautiful attributes of persuasion is people can always give a good reason and
choose not to be persuaded. No reputational or other costs are incurred so long
as your reason for opting out is generally acceptable.
I
imagine it was Charlie Munger who lists about ten or fifteen things out of a
list of forty or fifty that it really helps to hang on your mental mug tree.
You might not want to use them all the time. Quite a lot of the time, just
using standard rational approaches may be absolutely fine, but it's useful to
have a mental mug tree of the complex and counterintuitive.
When
you get stuck, the likelihood is that you're looking at something in the wrong
way, so just grabbing one of these mental mugs might be the "get out of
jail" card that moves your thinking on.
I'll
finish with one more, which seems to me something I've noticed, which may help
you increase diversity in your workforce without resorting to quotas or other
compulsion.
It
seems obvious that people instinctively increase the variance of things as they
buy more of them. When people do small weekly shops, they go to a greater
variety of shops than they do when they do one enormous £150 shop every ten
days.
If
you shop every three days, you'll go to a lot of different shops, some
upmarket, some downmarket. You might go to Walmart one day and Whole Foods the
next. If you do one enormous shop, you'll go very close to the middle. You'll
go somewhere that's absolutely midmarket.
Similarly,
when everybody had one car, most families had a saloon car at the time, a
fairly standard car. People with two cars almost never have one saloon car, let
alone two. In fact, they tend to have two cars that are wildly different—one
very large one and a smaller one. Variety increases with frequency, as it were.
That seems like a relatively obvious point.
If
I asked two people each to go and spend half a million dollars on a house,
you'd probably have two quite middle-of-the-road houses. If I asked you to
spend $1 million on two houses, the two houses would not be remotely similar.
One would be a flat in the center of town, the other one would be somewhere
miles out by the beach. All obvious enough, right?
Now,
what seems interesting to me is that no one has applied this thinking to
recruitment. If you want greater diversity of recruitment, hire people ten at a
time. When you hire people for one job, one at a time, you're very risk-averse,
and you go for someone close to the expected norm. If you're hiring ten
graduate recruits, you're looking for breadth. This happens without any quotas,
without any conscious affirmative action. It seems to me a natural property of
the human brain that the way we decide changes in variety simply by dint of
choosing a lot simultaneously rather than choosing one person at a time. That
seems to me an enormously important thing.
This
is borne out by the fact that the partners in accounting firms show much less
diversity than the graduate recruits do. You appoint partners one at a time,
and you hire graduates en masse. The fact that our instinctive mode of choice
changes depending on the way we choose, this seems to me just adding to the
literature on choice architecture. When you make a choice, it's always worth
asking, "How would I make this choice if the choices were presented
differently, if they were presented in a different order?"
Let's
talk about motor insurance. How do you get people to tell the truth? One of the
things that's been reliably found is that if you get people to sign at the
beginning of the process rather than at the end, they're more honest. This
seems revolutionarily weird. In the context of a form, we always sign the form
at the end. Yet when we have a court trial, you swear the oath before you start
giving evidence, not after you've finished.
What's
very interesting is this domain dependence, where things which are bloody
obvious in one domain, like where you get people to swear an oath in the
context of a court, become completely lost when we shift domain to the area of
an insurance document.
And,
on those forms, aren't we kind of encouraging people to lie? What happens if
you redesign an insurance application so you give people the chance to tell the
truth again at the end? I don't want to get into trouble here, but I have in
the past been mildly dishonest on insurance forms for my car. I've claimed that
the car was garaged when, in reality, it was probably only garaged one night in
twenty. When I leave the car out, it's a fairly long way from the main road, so
it’s not significantly at more risk than if it were garaged. So I’m not lying
much. But the reason I veer on the side of dishonesty is for all I know, it
might cost me £100 more a year to tell the truth. Even £200. The cost of
insurance is not transparent. I don't know how much it costs to tell the truth,
so I don't know whether the cost of telling the truth is worth it for the
feeling of being an honest person.
Selected
and edited from edge dot org for my Notes.
Late afternoon. You had lunch at Piada Street Italian, stopped at Kroger's; then once home headed out to do errands after which, at home, you finished copying and pasting the above article to save because you find it an interesting aspect of modern living. To you it says a lot about the real world in juxtaposition with your Notes and fictional world. You like the difference. Now, strangely perhaps, this is where you will find a hint of myself, a Betweener -- a consciousness that tends to exist between the 'real' world and 'the fiction' that human beings tend to sometimes dream up without realizing it. - Amorella
1657 hours. This shows you are a complete fiction then?
Not at all, boy. It shows people don't like to look where matters are not. This blog is full of such 'things'. Post. - Amorella
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