You
shared the BBC Future article on Free Will on your Facebook page yesterday and
you need to have this in your notes as a reminder from where to think. -
Amorella
** **
SUNDAY, DEC 28, 2014 07:00 AM EST
The truth about free
will: Does it actually exist?
Acclaimed philosopher Daniel
Dennett explains why free will is much more complicated than many people
believe
DAVID EDMONDS AND NIGEL WARBURTON
The
following interview is excerpted from "Philosophy
Bites Again"
David Edmonds: One way to
exercise my freedom would be to act unpredictably, perhaps not to have a
typical introduction to a “Philosophy Bites” interview, or to cut it
abruptly short mid-sentence. That’s the view of the famous philosopher and
cognitive scientist, Daniel Dennett. He also believes that humans can have free
will, even if the world is determinist, in other words, governed by causal
laws, and he…
Nigel Warburton: The topic
we’re focusing on is “Free Will Worth Wanting.” That seems a strange way in to
free will. Usually, the free will debate is over whether we have free will, not
whether we want it, or whether it’s worth wanting. How did you come at it from
this point of view?
Daniel Dennett: I came to
realize that many of the issues that philosophers love to talk about in the
free will debates were irrelevant to anything important. There’s a
bait-and-switch that goes on. I don’t think any topic is more anxiety
provoking, or more genuinely interesting to everyday people, than free will But
then philosophers replace the interesting issues with technical, metaphysical
issues. Who cares? We can define lots of varieties of free will that you can’t
have, or that are inconsistent with determinism. But so what? The question is,
‘Should you regret, or would you regret not having free will?’ Yes. Are there
many senses of free will? Yes. Philosophers have tended to concentrate on
varieties that are perhaps more tractable by their methods, but they’re not
important.
NW: The classic
description of the problem is this: ‘If we can explain every action through a
series of causal precedents, there is no space for free will.’ What’s wrong
with that description?
DD: It’s completely wrong.
There’s plenty of space for free will: determinism and free will are not
incompatible at all.
The problem is that
philosophers have a very simplistic idea of causation. They think that if you give
the lowest-level atomic explanation, then you have given a complete account of
the causation: that’s all the causation there is. In fact, that isn’t even
causation in an interesting sense.
NW: How is that
simplistic? After all , at the level of billiard balls on a table, one ball
hits another one and it causes the second one to move. Neither ball has any
choice about whether it moved; their paths were determined physically.
DD: The problem with that
is that it ignores all of the higher-level forms of causation which are just as
real and just as important. Suppose you had a complete atom-by-atom history of
every giraffe that ever lived, and every giraffe ancestor that ever lived. You
wouldn’t have an answer to the question of why they have long necks. There is
indeed a causal explanation, but it’s lost in those details. You have to go to
a different level in order to explain why the giraffe developed its long neck.
That’s the notion of causation that matters for free will.
NW: Assuming that you’re
not going to rely on Aesop here, how did the giraffe get its long neck?
DD: The lineage of
giraffe-like animals gradually got longer necks because those that happened to
have slightly longer necks had a fitness advantage over those with shorter
necks. That’s where the explanation lies. Why is that true? That’s still a
vexed question. Maybe the best answer is not the obvious one that they got long
necks so that they could reach higher leaves. Rather, they evolved long necks
because they needed them to drink because they had long legs, and they evolved
long legs because they provided a better defense against lions.
NW: So that’s an
evolutionary hypothesis about giraffes’ necks. How does it shed any light on
the free will debate?
DD: If I want to know why
you pulled the trigger, I won’t learn that by having an atom-by-atom account of
what went on in your brain. I’d have to go to a higher level: I’d have to go to
the intentional stance in psychology Here’s a very simple analogy: you’ve got a
hand calculator and you put in a number, and it gives the answer 3.333333E. Why
did it do that? Well, if you tap in ten divided by three, and the answer is an
infinite continuing decimal, the calculator gives an ‘E’.
Now, if you want to
understand which cases this will happen to, don’t examine each and every
individual transistor: use arithmetic. Arithmetic tells you which set of cases
will give you an ‘E’. Don’t think that you can answer that question by
electronics. That’s the wrong level. The same is true with playing computer
chess. Why did the computer move its bishop? Because otherwise its queen would
have been captured. That’s the level at which you answer that question.
NW: We’re often interested
in intention where this is linked to moral or legal responsibility. And some
cases depend on information that we get about people’s brains. For example,
there are cases where people had brain lesions that presumably had some causal
impact on their criminal behaviour.
DD: I’m so glad you raised
that because it perfectly illustrates a deep cognitive illusion that’s been
fostered in the field for a generation and more. People say, ‘Whenever we have
a physiological causal account, we don’t hold somebody responsible.’ Well,
might that be because whenever people give a physiological causal account,
these are always cases of disability or pathology? You never see a
physiological account of somebody getting something tight. Supposing we went
into Andrew Wiles’ brain and got a perfect physiological account of how he
proved Fermat’s Last Theorem. Would that show that he’s not responsible for his
proof? Of course not. It’s just that we never give causal physiological-level
accounts of psychological events when they go right.
NW: I’m still having
trouble understanding what an intention is. We usually think of intentions as
introspectible mental events that precede actions. That doesn’t seem to be
quite what you mean by an intention.
DO: When
discussing the ‘intentional stance’, the word ‘intention’ means something
broader than that. It refers to states that have content. Beliefs, desires, and
intentions are among the states that have content. To adopt the intentional
stance towards a person-it’s usually a person, but it could be towards a cat,
or even a computer, playing chess-is to adopt the perspective that you’re
dealing with an agent who has beliefs and desires, and decides what to do, and
what intentions to form, on the basis of a rational assessment of those
beliefs and desires. It’s the stance that dominates Game Theory. When, in the twentieth
century; John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern invented the theory of games,
they pointed out that game theory reflects something fundamental in strategy.
Robinson Crusoe on a desert island doesn’t need the intentional stance. If
there’s something in the environment that’s like an agent-that you can treat as
an agent-this changes the game. You have to start worrying about feedback
loops. If you plan activities, you have to think: ‘If I do this, this agent
might think of doing that in response, and what would be my response to that?’
Robinson Crusoe doesn’t have to be sneaky and tiptoe around in his garden
worrying about what the cabbages will do when they see him coming. But if
you’ve got another agent there, you do.
NW: So, Man Friday
appears, and there are problems …
DO: As
soon as Man Friday appears, then you need the intentional stance.
NW: So if you have the
complexity of interaction that is characteristic of an intentional system,
that’s sufficient for its having intentions. So there doesn’t seem to be any
room for the mistake of anthropomorphism. Anthropomorphism, if the
situation is complex enough, is simply the correct attitude to hold towards
some inanimate things.
DD: We can treat a tree
from the intentional stance, and think about what it needs, and what it wants,
and what steps it takes to get what it needs and wants. This works to some
degree. Of course, it doesn’t have a soul; it’s not conscious.
But there are certain
patterns and reactions. Recently, we’ve learned that many varieties of trees
have a capacity that gives them quasi-colour vision. When the light on them is
predominantly reflected from green things they change the proportion of their
energy that goes into growing tall We might say that they have sensed the
competition and are taking a reasonable step to deal with the competition. Now,
that’s a classic example of the intentional stance applied to a tree, for
heaven’s sake! Fancier versions apply to everything from bacteria, through
clams and fish and reptiles and higher animals, all the way to us. We are the
paradigm cases.
What’s special about us is
that we don’t just do things for reasons. Trees do things for reasons. But we
represent the reasons and we reflect on them, and the idea of reflecting on
reasons and representing reasons and justifying our reasons to each other
informs us and governs the intentional stance. We grow up learning to trade
reasons with our friends and family. We’re then able to direct that perspective
at evolutionary history, at artifacts, at trees. And then we see the reasons
that aren’t represented, but are active. Until you get the level of perspective
where you can see reasons, you ‘re not going to see free will The difference
between an organism that has free will and an organism that doesn’t has nothing
to do with the atoms: you’ll never see it at the atomic level, ever. You have
to go to the appropriate design level, and then it sticks out like a sore
thumb.
NW: So we can adopt
the intentional stance towards a chess-playing computer, and we probably ought
to if we want to beat it at chess, but it doesn’t follow from that that it’s
got free will, or agency?
DO: Exactly
Those beings with free will are a sub-set of intentional systems. We say ‘free
as a bird’, and birds have a certain sort of free will. But the free will of a
bird is nothing compared to our free will, because the bird doesn’t have the
cognitive system to anticipate and reflect on its anticipations. It doesn’t
have the same sort of projectable future that we have; nor does it, of course,
engage in the business of persuasion. One bird never talks another bird out of
doing something. It may threaten it, but it won’t talk it out of something.
NW: So let’s go back
to the original topic. What is the kind of free will worth wanting?
DO: It’s
the kind of free will that gives us the political freedom to move about in a
state governed by law and do what we want to do. Not everybody has that
freedom. It is a precious commodity Think about promises. There are many good
reasons to make promises: some long-term projects depend on promises, for
example. Now, not everybody is equipped to make a promise. Being equipped to
make a promise requires a sort of free will, and a sort of free will that is
morally important. We can take it apart, we can understand, as an engineer
might say; what the ‘specs’ are for a morally competent agent: you’ve got to be
well informed, have well-ordered desires, and be movable by reasons. You have
to be persuadable and be able to justify your views. And there are a few other
abilities that are a little more surprising. You have to be particularly good
at detecting the intent of other agents to manipulate you and you have to be
able to fend off this manipulation. One thing we require of moral agents is
that they are not somebody else’s puppet. If you want the buck to stop with
you, then you have to protect yourself from other agents who might be trying to
control you. In order to fend off manipulation, you should be a little bit
unpredictable. So having a poker face is a very big part of being a moral
agent. If you can’t help but reveal your state to the antique dealer when you
walk into the store, then you’re going to be taken for a ride, you’re going to
be manipulated. If you can’t help but reveal your beliefs and desires to
everybody that comes along, you will be a defective, a disabled agent. In order
to maximize getting what you want in life, don’t tell people exactly what you
want.
NW: That’s a very
cynical view of human nature! There’s an alternative account, surely, in which
being open about what you feel allows people to take you for what you really
are, not for some kind of avatar of yourself.
DD: Well, yes, there is
that. But think about courtship. You see a woman and you fall head over heels
in love with her. What ‘s about the worst thing you can do? Run panting up to
her showing her that you’ve fallen head over heels in love.
First of all, you’ll
probably scare her away, or she’ll be tempted by your very display of abject
adoration to wrap you around her little finger. You don’t want that, so you
keep something in reserve. Talleyrand once said that God gave men language so
that they could conceal their thoughts from each other. I think that’s a deep
observation about the role of language in communication. It’s essential to the
understanding of communication that it’s an intentional act, where you decide
which aspects of your world you want to inform people about and which you
don’t.
NW: So freedom, of the
important kind, of the kind worth wanting, is freedom from being manipulated.
It’s about being in control of your life, you choosing to do things, rather
than these things being chosen by somebody else?
DD: Yes. In order for us
to be self-controllers, to be autonomous in a strong sense, we have to make
sure that we” re not being controlled by others. Now, the environment in
general is not an agent, it’s not trying to control us. It’s only other agents
that try to control us. And it’s important that we keep them at bay so that we
can be autonomous. In order to do that, we have to have the capacity to
surprise.
Excerpted from “Philosophy
Bites Again” by David Edmonds and Nigel Warburton. Copyright ©
2014 by David Edmonds and Nigel Warburton. Reprinted by arrangement with Oxford
University Press, a division of Oxford University. All rights reserved.
Selected
and edited from - BBC Future - 09
January 2015 via (SalonDOTcom)
** **
1108
hours. ‘Communication is an intentional act.’ I had not thought of
communication in this way before. Obviously it is, even more so in misdirected
communication with intent, i.e. “War is peace. Freedom is slavery. Ignorance is
strength.” Yet, Freedom is in surveillance. I appreciate cameras on the streets
because if I am robbed under such surveillance it is more likely the thief will
be caught and hopefully punished for herorhis crime. Surveillance helps keep us
safe. A baby monitor is a good example of this. Why would a ‘moral agent’ fear
a surveillance camera? It is not a social free right to commit a crime against
fellow human beings, or rather; it should not be in my mind, yet I learned to abhor
the political totalitarian regimes that were a part of my childhood and I love
Orwell and Huxley for pointing out their defects in Animal Farm, 1984
and Brave New World. Such are the contradictions in this human’s
thoughts. What to do about it? Something will be done and we will most likely
witness it.
You have been home a while and noted the
weather is going to be rain, sleet and snow tomorrow afternoon through Monday,
thus you are at Kroger’s on Tylersville for items to make a soup or chili for a
couple of meals or so. Dusk is settling into evening, and the simulated nearby
church bells just finished their six o’clock chime. – Amorella
1805
hours. The trip home was good with light traffic and mostly clear sky. We had
lunch at Wendy’s in south Delaware as the boys were coming home from swimming
lessons at the local YMCA. It has been another good family day. I really get a
kick out of Owen and Brennan. I love to hear their language development. Kim,
Paul and their Primrose School do a really good job in training them to speak
clearly and distinctly with fun and games built in. Also, Owen is really
considerate and polite. Brennan is almost three and not so much of either
unless reminded. His favorite test word is still “No.” I caught him saying it a
couple of times today and laughed and asked if he was joking while using the word.
He admitted that sometimes he is.
Carol made two ham and egg omelets for
supper. After you watched “Elementary” and “Mysteries of Laura”. Carol is up
reading with Jadah at her side and you are in the living room with Spooky for
company. Both cats appear content that you are home – earlier a couple small
pieces of ham helped. – Amorella
2133
hours. When I was first reading the article above I found a couple of lines
that immediately made me think of “To A Mouse” by Robert Burns.
** **
“To a Mouse”
By Robert Burns
On Turning
up in Her Nest with the Plough, November, 1785
Wee,
sleeket, cowran, tim’rous beastie,
O, what a
panic’s in thy breastie!
Thou need
na start awa sae hasty,
Wi’ bickerin brattle!
I wad be
laith to rin an’ chase thee
Wi’ murd’ring pattle!
I’m truly
sorry Man’s dominion
Has broken
Nature’s social union,
An’
justifies that ill opinion,
Which makes thee startle,
At me, thy
poor, earth-born companion,
An’ fellow-mortal!
I doubt
na, whyles, but thou may thieve;
What then?
poor beastie, thou maun live!
A
daimen-icker in a thrave
’S a sma’ request:
I’ll get a
blessin wi’ the lave,
An’ never miss ’t!
Thy
wee-bit housie, too, in ruin!
It’s silly
wa’s the win’s are strewin!
An’ naething,
now, to big a new ane,
O’ foggage green!
An’ bleak
December’s winds ensuin,
Baith snell an’ keen!
Thou saw
the fields laid bare an’ waste,
An’ weary
Winter comin fast,
An’ cozie
here, beneath the blast,
Thou thought to dwell,
Till
crash! the cruel coulter past
Out thro’ thy cell.
That
wee-bit heap o’ leaves an’ stibble
Has cost
thee monie a weary nibble!
Now thou’s
turn’d out, for a’ thy trouble,
But house or hald,
To thole
the Winter’s sleety dribble,
An’ cranreuch cauld!
But
Mousie, thou art no thy-lane,
In proving
foresight may be vain:
The best
laid schemes o’ Mice an’ Men
Gang aft agley,
An’ lea’e
us nought but grief an’ pain,
For promis’d joy!
Still,
thou art blest, compar’d wi’ me!
The
present only toucheth thee:
But Och! I
backward cast my e’e,
On prospects drear!
An’
forward tho’ I canna see,
I guess an’ fear!
Selected
and edited from poetryfoundationDOTorg
** **
The
lines in the article are:
“We say ‘free as a bird’, and birds have a certain
sort of free will. But the free will of a bird is nothing compared to our
free will, because the bird doesn’t have the cognitive system to anticipate and
reflect on its anticipations. It doesn’t have the same sort of projectable
future that we have; nor does it, of course, engage in the business of
persuasion.”
I
have found in more than fifty years of my life devoted to reading literature
and poetry (and in the many subsequent re-readings) certain important human
concepts continually pop up and indeed overlap. This overlapping shows me
‘truths’ are ‘felt and understood’ as well as studied scholarly and show
evidence of a said ‘truth’. Both are valid as far as understanding the human
condition is concerned. This is a reminder to me that ‘understanding’ can be
more important than the ‘knowledge’ that leads to the understanding because
knowledge is a different consideration than wisdom but using wisdom must show
human understanding over the specific objective factual knowledge of the
situation. Using wisdom (moral agent) demands free will.
This is your point, but what is its purpose
here (in the blog)? – Amorella
2153
hours. Human freedom rests on the ability to use this freedom wisely. Freedom
is not all encompassing; it is limited. For instance, the health and safety of
the group supersedes the freedom of the individual within the group. Few would
deny this but some human beings do. I do not have a say in human social rules but in
my fiction I can use this as an argument for why the marsupial humanoid culture
is as it is.
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